



FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

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An International Raw-Materials Policy

by Manly Fleischmann

The agreement on basic metals reached by the United States and Britain on January 13 is an important milestone in the development of a sound international raw-materials policy essential to the strength and survival of the free world. While the substantive advantages of the agreement to each nation are obvious, the arrangement has longer-range significance not yet generally understood on either side of the Atlantic.

The substance of the mutual contract is simply stated. The United States, in the midst of a tremendous mobilization effort, is short of aluminum and has also been unable to buy tin in the world markets at what we consider a reasonable price. The British have an even greater need for steel in any form. As a result of the arrangements recently concluded, each nation will find its particular problems measurably eased. We will sell to the British approximately 1,000,000 tons of steel in shapes and forms which we can best spare; they will sell to us some 55,000,000 pounds of aluminum and 20,000 tons of tin at a price we are willing to pay.

The association of nations in international trade has always been a source of mutual

economic gain. In time of peace the objective was a rise in living standards, secured through maximizing in all nations the benefits derived from the specialized resources, scientific knowledge, managerial capacity and labor skills in each nation.

Now we have even more urgent reasons to search out ways and means for stimulating and organizing the agreements on the use of materials among the associated free nations. It is no longer a matter of maximizing economic benefits. The objective is survival—survival for the United States and survival for the free world.

Two thoroughly misleading ideas are in general circulation today. The first, reflecting the tradition of the limitless resources of the American economy and its unparalleled productive capacity, is that going it alone we can achieve any economic objectives we choose to establish. The second, reflecting our experience in World War II, is that if we make an enormous productive effort within a short period of time, we can assure our safety into the indefinite future. Both of these ideas are erroneous, and their currency is dangerous to our national security.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Partly as a result of the depletion of our own natural resources and partly as a result of the changing technology and scale of military and industrial production, we have become to a considerable extent a "have not" nation. A recent report of the United States Bureau of Mines indicates that out of 38 important industrial minerals, we are self-sufficient in only 9. For another 20, domestic production provides less than 60 per cent of our requirements. For 7 of these 20 minerals, we are dependent on other countries for just about 100 per cent of our needs. The special material requirements of the mobilization program, multiplying at a fantastic rate our needs for nickel, copper, cobalt, columbium, uranium and many other minerals, have greatly increased our dependence on foreign sources of supply. American self-sufficiency in raw materials is a myth. We must re-orient our thinking, and we must plan our international policies to reflect this reality.

U.S. Cannot "Go It Alone"

Today, moreover, we cannot follow the pattern of 1941-1945. Then, the combination that built our victory included a powerful, all-out drive for munitions output during an initial period of time bought for us by our allies, and the protection afforded our home front by distance. Now, we are mobilizing against a threat whose time of impact is unknown; the projection period of danger makes it impossible to follow the former policy of shutting off

civilian production to devote all our resources to military production; and the raw-materials balance sheet is markedly less favorable, unless we make, in cooperation with our allies, more effective and more imaginative use of our collective resources.

When this nation decided to disarm at the conclusion of World War II, we did not fully understand the circumstances of the times. We chose to disarm, as it now appears, in the face of four technological revolutions which cannot fail to have a massive impact on the conditions of human life. There have been many technological revolutions in the past, but never has there been such a concurrence of forces leading to change as has appeared within the last decade. These, specifically, are the developments in the fields of atomic energy, jet propulsion, electronics and petro-chemicals. Any one of these four technological revolutions would have enormous implications for the problems of national survival. The four together, with their related problems of timing and materials-supply, raise issues of the greatest seriousness and introduce new concepts with respect to the unity of the free world.

Contrary to popular belief, the nations on which we depend for materials are not content to accept payment in dollars if they cannot spend them for the materials and products they need. They will send us what we need from them only if they are assured that we will send them what they need from us. This will mean sacrifices on both sides.

To the extent that we can secure international agreements allocating materials on the basis of need, giving full effect to the composition of each nation's need in terms of normal use and current requirements for military purposes, we can minimize the destructive price competition for critical materials in world markets that has been weakening our efforts to hold off inflation and simultaneously distorting material flows without reference to the free world's defense. The international allocation of materials is as necessary and logical in this period of supply-demand unbalance as we have found domestic allocation to be in similar circumstances.

Allocation Essential

We could not hope to achieve the balanced military and civilian program that we are organizing—in the face of requirements running from 50 to 100 per cent in excess of supply—if we allowed price competition in free markets to direct the distribution of steel, copper and aluminum. The essence of our programming operations under the Controlled Materials Plan in this country is that critical materials in short supply shall not be pre-empted by the highest bidders or move in accordance with normal pre-Korean consumption patterns. Rather, they are channeled to users in terms of relative essentiality of need consistent with established mobilization objectives. There are just as compelling reasons for using the same criteria to

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Joint Chiefs of Staff and U. S. Policy

In the brief period of five years the Joint Chiefs of Staff have become one of the most important influences in American public life. An act of Congress in 1947 made the institution a permanent part of the defense establishment, with responsibility chiefly for evolving the military strategy of the United States. Now the four Army, Air Force and Navy officers who are the Joint Chiefs not only make military plans; they also make foreign policy.

Germany and Lisbon

The North Atlantic Council's decision in Lisbon on February 22 to admit Germany to the proposed European army is testimony to the authority of the Joint Chiefs in world political affairs.

The United States supported the continued demilitarization of Germany until General Omar N. Bradley, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, told the House Appropriations Committee in May 1950 that a rearmed Germany had become essential to the defense of the West. Three months later the National Security Council recommended that American foreign policy reflect this point of view, and in September 1950 Secretary of State Dean Acheson announced to the North Atlantic Council, then meeting in New York, that the United States favored the remilitarization of Germany as a complement to the military power which the North Atlantic allies themselves were gathering. When subsequently it became obvious that the European neighbors of Germany would not go along with this policy unless the German armed forces were included in an international European army, where

German troops could not easily serve purely German purposes, then the Joint Chiefs gradually were won over to the idea of the European army.

During the visit of British Prime Minister Winston Churchill to Washington this January General Bradley privately urged him to support the European army. While Britain has declined to join the army, British support for the idea that such an army should be created helped to carry the day at Lisbon. In the 18 months since Mr. Acheson, to satisfy the Joint Chiefs, put the question before the North Atlantic Council, the issue of Germany's military revival has complicated Washington's diplomatic dealings with our European allies, some of whom regard Germany as a menace rather than a safeguard. The Joint Chiefs, however, consider the rearming of Germany necessary on military grounds, and this point of view has prevailed over civilian objections.

Influence in Other Areas

The influence of the Joint Chiefs is visible in American foreign policy regarding many other areas. The policy of aiding General Chiang Kai-shek to strengthen his military force on Formosa has been formulated by the Joint Chiefs (one point on which they agree with General Douglas MacArthur), and the State Department simply goes along with it, principally because military policy in this instance suits the present temper of Congress. The Joint Chiefs have persistently urged the United States to negotiate a military agreement with Spain to buttress the Atlantic alliance on the south as German rearmament would buttress it on the

east. Over State Department objections that have grown weaker and weaker until they are now inaudible, the Joint Chiefs apparently are to have their way—again because they have the support of many Congressmen.

The full measure of the effect of the Joint Chiefs on foreign policy is difficult to estimate because these officers hold views that often seem contradictory. For one thing, they give the impression that basically they are isolationists. Their long grounding in the proposition that their primary task is to secure the continental United States makes them queasy about American commitments to help nations far from our shores. As a result, they did not enthusiastically support the policies of military aid and of the North Atlantic alliance when these were first broached. Once those policies were adopted, however, they suggested improvements which military logic recommends to them. Their predisposition toward isolationism is thus reconciled with their interest in Formosa, Germany, Spain, Greece and Turkey. At the same time their philosophical preoccupation with continental security prevents them from becoming warmongers. For example, the Joint Chiefs did not consider Korea essential to American security. Mr. Acheson, not the military men, proposed United States and UN intervention in Korea.

Detailed study of the rise of the Joint Chiefs' influence within the military establishment and of their role in the realm of foreign policy is seriously needed if the United States is to carry out its foreign policy responsibilities intelligently.

BLAIR BOLLES

Should U. S. Give More Economic Aid to Europe?

by Howard C. Gary

Mr. Gary, former research associate of the Foreign Policy Association on economic problems, is with the department of economics of the McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, Incorporated, in New York.

A MERICAN security would suffer a severe blow if the shadow of economic chaos were to descend on any of the free nations of the world. This proposition applies with special force to Western Europe. If the skilled manpower and physical production of that area were subtracted from the assets of the free world, then the balance between East and West would be critically altered to the West's disadvantage. Viewed in this light, the forthcoming debate in Congress on the foreign aid program assumes "pride of place" in the realm of foreign policy questions.

Senator Harry F. Byrd, Democrat of Virginia, has already sounded the tocsin on behalf of economy-minded legislators. He proposes that the entire \$2.5 billion of economic aid that President Truman requested for the fiscal year beginning July 1 be cut from the budget.

Operation Rat-hole?

Two arguments are presented as the justifications for slashing foreign aid. First, it is asserted that the money will not yield observable results. In fact, past experience, it is said, should have already revealed that foreign aid goes down the drain. Second, inflationary pressures generated by our own mobilization program are so great that the well-being of our economy demands a sharp retrenchment in the foreign economic aid program. It should be noted that comparatively few Congressmen urge a major surgery of the foreign military aid program.

Let us examine both of these arguments.

Admittedly, it is ironical that after four years and \$12 billion of Marshall plan aid, Europe should find itself in straits that appear as desperate as the dark days of 1947. The dollar-gap is a major problem; most nations are plagued by an imbalance in their overseas trading accounts; the struggle against inflation is a difficult and a frustrating task; and the crying need now—as in 1947—is to increase productivity.

Nevertheless, the production gains in the last four years verge on the phenomenal. In 1947 the specter of starvation haunted the Continent. The agricultural targets drawn up at that time seemed unattainable. Yet the output of bread grains, potatoes, sugar, meat, milk, and fats and oils in 1951 overshot the mark. Only cereal production—which amounted to 64.1 million metric tons in 1951—fell short. And even there the margin of error was but a scant 1.7 million metric tons.

The only blemish on the record in industrial production is coal. Last year's output of 460 million metric tons was substantially below the target of 511 million tons. While Germany, France and Belgium failed to meet their quotas, the main deficiency was in Britain, where coal production of 223 million tons was 26 million tons below plan. But steps are being taken to remedy this thorniest of all European production problems. Workers are being recruited, the pits are being fitted with capital equipment, and the incentives to boost output are being strengthened.

The other basic industries—steel, petroleum, electric power—have

made substantial gains, and aggregate targets have been more than met.

The record on holding the price line, however, does not encourage optimism. In Britain, by the fourth quarter of 1951, wholesale prices had advanced 27 per cent over the pre-Korean level. The figure for France was 33 per cent; for Germany, 25 per cent; for the Netherlands, 24 per cent; for Sweden, 37 per cent; for Belgium, 27 per cent; and for Italy—which has suffered from substantial unemployment and idle factories—16 per cent.

Until the outbreak of the Korean war European inflation was of the creeping variety. The impact first of mobilization in this country and then of Europe's own defense program accelerated the price rise. It would be indiscreet, however, for us to become too vexed at Europe's inability to keep prices down. The lessons of our own recent past prove conclusively that inflation and shortages are the twin by-products of military mobilization.

The tremendous impact of mobilization must also be held responsible for the present size of Europe's trade gap. Pre-Korean optimism regarding Europe's ability to pay its way in world trade was unfounded. But the annual deficit had been reduced to manageable proportions.

Present indications are that the trough of this latest crisis will be passed by June. The Western European nations will then have completed the transition to military production. Agreements reached at the international material conferences

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Implementation of the decisions reached by the North Atlantic Treaty Council at Lisbon will raise new questions as to the amount and character of economic aid the United States may be called upon to give its Western European allies to help them carry the burden of rearmament. These questions will be debated in Congress at a time when many Congressmen, with an eye on the elections, advocate economies in United States expenditures. On the left-hand page are the pros in this debate; here are the cons.

THE principal arguments made by Americans in and out of Congress who either object to continuation of economic aid to Europe or oppose any increase in aid to ease the rearmament burden undertaken by our NATO allies may be summarized as follows:

1. Seven years of spending on foreign aid have cost the United States more than \$25 billion but have failed to bring concrete results. In fact, the more help we give, the more Europe and the other continents demand help from us. The period of experiment with foreign aid has been long enough to show the inability of either this country or the countries we aid to eliminate the fundamental causes of their difficulties. The aid program therefore should end now, and the money that would be wasted on them should be put to other uses—perhaps right here at home, in helping some of our relatively neglected areas.

2. Every aid program creates disappointment for the United States. Most of the recipients of the aid we gave through UNRRA are now under the domination of the U.S.S.R. Whatever strength the economies of those countries gained through UNRRA is now being used to the disadvantage of the United States. Most of the countries helped by the Marshall plan, inaugurated in 1947, still desperately need economic aid, although Administration officials assured Congress last summer that the plan had accomplished its purpose. Moreover, many of the NATO countries receiving military aid from us

refuse to cooperate with one another and with the United States in making effective use of that aid through joint defense arrangements. For example, they make gestures toward the European army, but after more than a year of conferences that army still only exists on paper. Military aid is meant to strengthen the West, but it only weakens the Western coalition by provoking disagreements among the NATO allies. The United States would get more out of the \$6 billion spent this year on military aid if the money went to the American forces at home and abroad.

3. The Truman Administration persuaded Congress to support both the Marshall plan and military aid by describing them as devices that would end the influence of communism in Western Europe. Yet the two aid programs have not had this effect at all. It is true that the Communist representation in European parliaments has fallen off since 1946. But the Communists remain extraordinarily powerful in the trade unions, notably in France and Italy, and retain strong political leverage. Communist workers, it is contended, are not reliable allies in a struggle against the U.S.S.R., and the Defense Department should not place orders in European factories employing workers who are members of Communist trade unions.

4. A major United States business organization, the United States Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, recommended on

February 28 that future American aid to most of Western Europe should in essence be confined to military assistance, with emphasis on its economic effects. "It is difficult," said the Council, "to justify continuation of assistance to European countries which have regained and surpassed prewar levels of production and consumption." This, the Council contends, is especially true since continued economic assistance may serve only to delay necessary fiscal and monetary reforms.

5. The peoples of Western European nations apparently do not see the world crisis in the same terms as Americans. The most disturbing aspect of the situation is that European leaders are apparently not as afraid of Russian aggression as we are. The United States will be throwing money away if we try to buy the solidarity of the Western European nations by military aid and either continued or increased economic aid.

The United States, so critics of the Administration contend, will be better off if it maintains its own military force in Europe instead of spending more billions in a vain effort to persuade other nations to improve their military forces. Six American divisions are now stationed in Germany and Austria. They represent a sufficient warning to the Soviet Union that a Russian attack on Western Europe would mean prompt military resistance by the United States. This, so the argument runs, is probably enough in itself to save us from World War III.

Gary

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and more conservative stockpiling by the United States have helped to soften the price picture as far as strategic raw materials are concerned. Europe—despite the fact that it is currently in the throes of a crisis—is producing more than it has at any time in its history.

Burden on the U.S.

President Truman's budget message for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1953 predicted a \$14 billion deficit. But this figure can be halved quite easily. Washington officials have consistently overestimated expenditures and guessed too low on future revenues. It is safe to predict that this propensity to expect the worst leads to overstating the deficit by at least \$2 billion. And the

President's message did not take account of the \$4.5 billion income that will accrue to the Federal trust funds. Since this money can be used to finance spending, the cash deficit should be no more than \$7 billion.

The inflationary potential of the deficit need not be greatly feared. If the Treasury succeeds in its campaign to sell bonds to individuals, that should take a good part of the sting out of the deficit. The portion of the \$7 billion which would have to be financed through the commercial banks would then be quite modest.

Further, if, as now seems likely, the metals supply situation should ease later in the year, the production of civilian goods may not be sharply curtailed. There may even be some slackness in the market for certain consumer durable goods. And producers of soft goods—especially tex-

tiles—have been plagued by poor business since March 1951. On balance, it seems very unlikely that the American economy is in for another round of sharp, steep price rises.

It might be closer to the facts to say that this nation cannot afford not to have a program of foreign economic aid. The modest insurance premium—much less than 1 per cent of our gross national product—represented by our economic aid is but a token payment for the benefits we reap. We have moved a long way from the days when purely commercial considerations of risk and profitability were the criteria for judging the potential efficacy of an expenditure. No entry in a profit and loss statement could possibly reflect how much higher this nation's world stakes are now than ever before in history.

FOREIGN POLICY SPOTLIGHT



Lisbon Success and Europe's Crisis

The Lisbon conference of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization which closed on February 26 has been widely hailed as a historic turning-point in the uphill efforts of the Western nations to achieve a formula of unity which would prevent Russian aggression, hold German military resurgence in check, win the support of Britain and forge lasting ties between Western Europe and the United States.

This long hoped-for, but hitherto elusive, unity has been achieved in Lisbon not, in the first instance, through new methods of political and economic integration but through an agreement to create a European army serving the European Defense Community which will ultimately include German divisions as well as divisions furnished

by Germany's World War II opponents. To organize, train, clothe, feed, arm and direct this army, headed by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the NATO states agreed at Lisbon to set up political and economic institutions which, it is hoped, will eventually provide the framework of a united Western Europe. Thus military cooperation is to be the core of the prospective political and economic union.

Structural Changes

The central political institution of NATO will be a permanent council with headquarters in Paris, directed by a secretary-general described as "a civilian Eisenhower." The ministers of the 14 NATO countries (at Lisbon Greece and Turkey were admitted to the now geographically

misnamed North Atlantic coalition) will meet with the permanent council at least three times a year. The secretary-general will report every six months on how each NATO country is fulfilling its military and economic commitments, thereby assuring "continuous review" of progress measured in terms of armed strength as well as political and economic capacity to carry rearmament burdens.

Such a review was recommended by the Temporary Council Committee of "Three Wise Men"—W. Averell Harriman of the United States, Sir Eric Plowden of Britain and Jean Monnet of France—which had been appointed at the Ottawa conference of NATO last September to appraise and coordinate the defense and economic capabilities of member countries. The report of this

committee, which assessed and apportioned national contributions for the common defense of the European community, was accepted by the 14 nations at Lisbon.

These nations also accepted the recommendation of the TCC that NATO should advance its timetable for the creation of an adequate European army from 1954 to 1952, with the maximum number of divisions to be raised by the end of this year set at between 40 and 50, and the number of planes at 4,000. For the reason that strategic air power is a persuasive deterrent to aggression and that necessary air bases should be made available to NATO forces as swiftly as possible, the NATO Council added Tunisia and Morocco, French protectorates in North Africa, to the defense area within its jurisdiction. The United States insisted that henceforth its NATO partners pay 60 per cent of the costs of the coalition's "infrastructure"—that is, airfields and other permanent installations in Europe for the common use of the North Atlantic forces. The United States pledged a considerable increase in American air power but no further assignment of American ground troops short of war, other than replacements of the six divisions now stationed in Europe. Nor did the United States promise to give additional economic aid to its allies, except for such aid as they will derive from stepped-up "offshore" American purchases of European products which will be paid in dollars.

An effort was thus made in Lisbon to strike a workable and effective balance between the responsibilities, expenditures and advantages of the various members of the coalition.

Encouraged by the unexpectedly wide area of agreement achieved at Lisbon, the NATO statesmen returned to tackle, in their respective

capitals, the admittedly still harder task of implementing the conference resolutions. Three problems, unresolved in the Lisbon discussions, remain particularly troublesome.

The first of these concerns Germany. While the NATO members, including France, agreed, for lack of another alternative, on the inclusion of German divisions in the European army, the government of French Premier Edgar Faure, on the eve of Lisbon, had promised the French Socialists that no recruiting of Germans would take place this year. Meanwhile, to placate German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, whose right-wing supporters, like the German Social Democrats, had been demanding a greater measure of equality for Germany, the United States and Britain—although agreeing with France that Bonn should not for the present be admitted to NATO—made in London on February 17 a series of political and economic concessions which represent a notable victory for the West German state.

The Proof of the Pudding

Will these concessions assure genuine German support for a European army? Or are they only the first installment of the mounting price the Western wartime allies may have to pay for German aid? And will American and British acquiescence in Bonn's demands spur the rise of militant nationalism in Germany? A grim answer is contained in the quarterly report of United States High Commissioner John J. McCloy, issued on February 27, in which he predicts "general disaster" unless reviving German nationalism is "halted."

Closely linked to the issues presented by the revival of Germany is the second problem—the financial weakness of France, which after the Lisbon conference appeared to be

tottering on the brink of a new crisis, as Premier Faure returned to seek a 15 per cent increase in taxes to finance the cost of rearmament. The Faure cabinet fell on February 29 amid demands for a government of national union, while Gaullist leaders continued to criticize what they regard as undue surrender of French sovereignty to the NATO organization. France's situation is complicated by its unresolved conflicts with the nationalists of Tunisia and Morocco, whose agitation for independence might, in the opinion of some observers, jeopardize the security of the air bases the United States has built or is planning to build on their territory.

The third immediate problem, which has received least publicity, is the extent to which the British trade unions, which had displayed a firm discipline as long as the Labor government was in power, may react against the new austerity program initiated by the Churchill cabinet. The Labor party leaders have indicated concern over the possibility of strikes, which might not only impede defense production but might also accelerate the rise to power within the party of Aneurin Bevan, who has long contended that living standards should not be sacrificed to rearmament. Bitter debate about Labor and government policy on China and the atomic bomb has aggravated Britain's political situation.

Thus while the superstructure of a vast coalition has been blueprinted at Lisbon, thoughtful Europeans—and some Americans—are wondering whether the ground on which it is to be built will prove sufficiently firm. They regret that the NATO Council, while stressing armaments, said so little about the need of Western Europe for political reconstruction and social improvement.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

As Others See Us

Commenting on the controversy about German rearmament, Paul Sethe, in the independent German newspaper *Frankfurter Allgemeine*, said in February that while he has long recognized the necessity of German rearmament, he wishes Germany had been allowed time to heal its psychological wounds. "Our American friends," he declared, "refused to give us this time. Presumably they had no true idea of how deep a confusion and bewilderment reign in wide sections of opinion."

In the independent progressive French newspaper *Le Monde*, Maurice Duverger on February 14 pointed out the close relationship in Germany between the issues of rearmament and unification. He urged the French government to seek a showdown on unification before Germany proceeds to rearm. "The result of this French initiative," he contended, "would be a complete change in the moral position of the West. If unity failed because of a Russian refusal, Moscow, instead of the Atlantic powers, would be responsible for German rearmament, a fact of capital importance for world opinion and specially important for the peoples of Central Europe, where fear of

German soldiers is very real."

An editorial of February 10 in the independent *Corriere della Sera* of Milan deplored the disagreement between the United States and Britain about policy toward China. This disagreement, the editorial declared, encourages the Chinese Communists in Korea to postpone the conclusion of a truce. "What is worse is that this whole controversy is irrelevant. [British] Labor is fighting to prevent America from doing something that she cannot do. The MacArthur strategy was possible at the time of the MacArthur crisis, but now the Americans have lost control of the air and are not likely soon to recover it. For the time being, therefore, America does not have a choice between 'MacArthurism' and concluding an armistice. The outlook is rather for a continuation of the stalemate or a large-scale Chinese offensive."

Fleischmann

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direct the international flow of such key materials as nickel and copper. We cannot afford waste in the distribution of these resources, nor should we confound our attempts to prevent inflation and stabilize purchasing power by engaging in an auctioneering approach to material flows in world markets.

Not the least among the benefits to be derived by other countries from the conclusion of such mutually advantageous arrangements with the United States would be the realization by large numbers of our own people that we are really part of an international team. The American public often erroneously tends to think of American assistance as a one-way street benefiting no one but the recipient. Startling as it may seem, the truth is that our own nation could not build its defenses—even the defenses of our own border—without the aid of the other nations of the free world which produce the materials we lack.

There need be no fear about the ability of the free world to maintain itself if it understands the special characteristics of the crisis of our times and organizes its resources to meet them. It will take moral courage and patience of a kind that were not called for in the last great war. Above all, it will take the wisdom to build on mutual strengths, rather than yield to the selfish urge to speculate for temporary advantage in dollars or in materials.

(Mr. Fleischmann, Defense Production Administrator, served in the War Production Board and in the U.S. Navy and O.S.S. in World War II. A graduate of Harvard University and the University of Buffalo Law School, he was president of the Buffalo Council on World Affairs before returning to Washington.)

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In the next issue

A Foreign Policy Report

Food and Freedom in India

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